sábado, 30 de novembro de 2013

Homem e Mulher os Criou - por Pedro Vaz Patto



            Foi recentemente publicada uma carta pastoral da Conferência Episcopal portuguesa sobre a visão cristã da sexualidade, a propósito da difusão da chamada “ideologia do género”.       
            É oportuna esta nota. Na verdade, a difusão (por vezes, verdadeira imposição) da “ideologia do género” não é um fantasma, e muita gente não chega a aperceber-se das suas implicações, que Bento XVI chegou a qualificar como “revolução antropológica” (isto é, modificação profunda do modo como as culturas, influenciadas pelo cristianismo ou outras religiões, têm encarado a pessoa humana e a família). Essas implicações vão desde a esfera legislativa (leis sobre o casamento entre pessoas do mesmo sexo, adoção por uniões homossexuais, mudança de sexo, etc) até à linguagem corrente (de forma planeada e não inocente, passou a falar-se em “género” em vez de “sexo”, ou “homem e mulher”). Uma notícia recente dava conta da presença em escolas portuguesas de ações destinadas a incutir junto de crianças e jovens a ideia da aprovação da prática homossexual (o que vai para além do respeito sempre devido a qualquer pessoa).
            Mas o que é, então, a “ideologia do género”?
            Para esta corrente de pensamento, a diferença entre o masculino e o feminino não radica na natureza, mas resulta de uma construção social (por isso se fala em “género” e não “sexo”). Porque assim é, pode o “género” não corresponder ao “sexo”, porque qualquer construção social pode ser “desconstruída”. E também não existe um desígnio natural na união entre homem e mulher, esta é apenas uma entre várias formas de família (por isso, passa a falar-se em “famílias”, e não em “família”).
            Esta visão contrasta frontalmente com a visão bíblica e cristã, de que são reflexo as palavras do Génesis: «Ele os criou homem e mulher» (1, 27); «Deus, vendo toda a sua obra, considerou-a muito boa» (1, 31). Como afirmou a propósito Bento XVI no seu discurso à Cúria Romana de 21 de dezembro de 2012; segundo a “ideologia do género”, o homem «nega a sua própria natureza, decidindo que esta não lhe é dada como um facto pré-constituído, mas é ele próprio quem a cria»; «contesta a sua própria natureza; agora, é só espírito e vontade»; «a manipulação da natureza, que hoje deploramos em relação ao meio ambiente, torna-se aqui a escolha básica do homem a respeito de si mesmo». Segundo a visão desta ideologia, são negados o significado do corpo e da realidade objetiva, tal como a verdade como algo que não é por nós construído, mas nos é “dado” e por nós descoberto e acolhido.
            Mas a perspetiva em que se coloca a nota da Conferência Episcopal não é a da simples crítica. É também a da apresentação, pela positiva, da beleza da visão cristã da sexualidade, a qual não se confunde com a da “família tradicional” e até está, em grande medida, por descobrir.
            Essa visão reconhece e valoriza a dualidade sexual como expressão do desígnio do amor de Deus criador. Nenhuma das dimensões masculina e feminina exprime o humano em toda a sua riqueza e plenitude e este resulta apenas da colaboração e comunhão entre os dois sexos (a partir da família, mas também em todas as dimensões da vida social). Cada um dos sexos, e cada pessoa sexuada, reconhece., assim, humildemente, os seus limites e a importância do “outro” e do “diferente”. É a partir desta unidade na diferença mais básica e fundamental que se exprime a estrutural relacionalidade da pessoa. À imagem de um Deus uno e trino, a pessoa humana, homem e mulher, realiza-se plenamente na relação e na comunhão, no “ser para o outro”.
            Mais do que a qualquer polémica, é ao testemunho vivencial desta visão do amor e da sexualidade humana que são chamados os cristãos e as famílias cristãs.

quarta-feira, 27 de novembro de 2013

Facing the Fallout of Artificial Reproductive Technologies – by Jennifer Lahl, founder and president of the Center for Bioethics and Culture.

In CWR

“Egg or sperm donors don’t help other people have children, they help other people have their children,” says Jennifer Lahl, founder and president of the Center for Bioethics and Culture

Lahl spoke with Catholic World Report about her work to assist the most defenseless affected by the rapidly changing and largely unregulated world of biotechnology. 

The CBC has produced three original, award-winning documentary films: Anonymous Father’s Day (2011), about children of sperm donors who long to know more about their biological fathers; Eggsploitation (2010), which uncovers the serious risks associated with human egg donation; and Lines That Divide (2009), focusing upon the stem-cell research debate. 

CWR: Your work at the Center for Bioethics and Culture tries to help the most vulnerable affected by biotechnology. Other than, say, “spare embryos” from IVF, who else are you looking to assist? 

Lahl: Our work focuses on end-of-life issues, like euthanasia, and “making life” issues via assisted reproductive technologies. The most vulnerable we seek to give a voice to are those facing terminal illness, disabilities, [the] suffering (those society says have a life not worth living), and also the stakeholders in assisted reproductive technology (ART), e.g., egg donors, surrogate mothers, and the children created by these technologies. 

Of course, we do advocate against sperm donation too, and it may be a stretch to say a sperm donor is vulnerable, but we seek to educate them on the realities of donor conception.  I often say to egg donors (and it could be said of sperm donation), you didn’t help a woman (or a couple or man) have a baby, you helped her have your baby. 

CWR: The intense emotional desire to be a parent is the main motivation behind surrogacy and technologies like IVF. Your work, however, especially your films, focuses on different sets of emotions beyond those of potential parents. Tell us about those. 

Lahl: Our films are feature-length (versus shorts), partly because the complexities we lay out require more than your typical short film. What is really lacking in the discussions of ART [that deal with] with infertile couples (or even couples/individuals who use third-party reproductive technologies) is a fully orbed discussion of ALL the stakeholders. Buyer and sellers. Donors and recipients and, of course, the children. 

My background is nursing. I worked for over 20 years in nursing, primarily in pediatrics. I understand the realities of the medical risks and procedures to women and children. I read the data about these risks—known and unknown—and also about the reality that the majority of IVF cycles fail. I’ve taken care of preemie babies in intensive care units and seen the harm done to children born out of multiple births. Also, I’ve met and interviewed women seriously harmed by making the decision to “donate” their eggs, and children, now adults, conceived by donor conception who are not “alright,” like Hollywood purports. These stories, these voices, these facts demand to be included in the conversation. Sadly, the industry stakeholders only tell the happy stories of desperate couples who get children of their dreams.  

CWR: As more and more people are conceived through sperm donors or born of surrogate mothers, are there unexpected consequences playing out in the lives of these individuals? 

Lahl: I suppose one surprising thing that is happening is they’re finding each other via social media and online forums, so that they are building a community—working together, sharing their stories, which validates many of their thoughts and feelings. Typically, these people are told to be happy they were wanted. Be happy they are alive. Be thankful for these technologies which gave them life. And, of course, they are happy to be alive, but it’s valid and legitimate that they may not be pleased with the method of their conception. 

I remember doing our premiere screening of our film Anonymous Father’s Day in NYC. Many of the donor-conceived people in the film and in the social media world were on hand. While many of these people “knew” each other via emails and Facebook, etc., it was so fun for them all to meet each other in person, gathered around a  common theme shared by them all.  

CWR: What sorts of resources are there for someone in this position who wishes to know more about his biological parent or parents? 

Lahl:  DNA home-testing has really dropped in price and become affordable for many. So, along with DNA testing and groups like the donor sibling registry, people are making matches with biological parents and half-siblings. As these technologies become more prevalent and advanced, it really will be hard to keep anonymity a reality in third-party agreements. But of course all of this testing and matching depends on the child being told their conception story…. Many people do not tell their children they were conceived by donor eggs or sperm.  

CWR: Egg donation is on the rise, especially since women can be paid for their eggs. Are there risks involved for the donor? 

Lahl: I encourage all to watch Eggsploitation, where we outline the short- and long-term risks of egg donation. Naturally, any woman undergoing a surgical procedure to harvest her eggs [faces] all those risks—bleeding, infection, risks of anesthesia, risks of the drugs she takes to produce many eggs (egg donors typically produce upwards of 20, 40, 60 eggs at a time). 

The most serious short-term risk is Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome (OHSS), which can cause strokes, organ failure, even, in rare cases, death. Young women (exactly the egg donor profile) are most susceptible to OHSS. And of course, unlike the infertile woman, who is treated like a patient, the egg donor is being paid to produce lots and lots of eggs, and is therefore more aggressively stimulated. Long-term risks are more problematic to identify, since we have not done the necessary studies on what I call the “healthy non-patient” egg donor. There are cancer risks from fertility drugs. There is the risk to the donor of lost or damaged fertility.  

CWR: In general, the entire enterprise seems to be very risky, with only 19 percent of IVF treatments being effective, but also in terms of health and the well-being of the children created through these technologies. Is there any regulation of the industry to make people aware of the risks? 

Lahl: Sadly, there is no regulation in place to provide people with information about these risks. In my state of California we attempted to pass modest legislation which would have required egg-donor ads to have a warning label, similar to cigarettes, stating that no long-term studies have been done on this practice. The industry stakeholders (very wealthy and powerful) got involved and were able to gut the bill then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed, which said if you follow the American Society for Reproductive Medicine guidelines (which are meaningless and non-enforceable), you are exempt from placing warning labels on your ads. Of course all the agencies say they follow the guidelines. It shows the uphill battle we face in protecting and fully informing women.

Answering Common Objections to the Uniqueness of Christianity - by Peter Kreeft

In CERC 
 
Ronald Knox once quipped that "the study of comparative religions is the best way to become comparatively religious."
 
The reason, as G. K. Chesterton says, is that, according to most "scholars" of comparative religion, "Christianity and Buddhism are very much alike, especially Buddhism." 
 
But any Christian who does apologetics must think about comparative religions because the most popular of all objections against the claims of Christianity today comes from this field.   The objection is not that Christianity is not true but that it is not the truth; not that it is a false religion but that it is only a religion.   The world is a big place, the objector reasons; "different strokes for different folks".   How insufferably narrow-minded to claim that Christianity is the one true religion! God just has to be more open-minded than that. 

This is the single most common objection to the Faith today, for "today" worships not God but equality.   It fears being right where others are wrong more than it fears being wrong.   It worships democracy and resents the fact that God is an absolute monarch.   It has changed the meaning of the word honor from being respected because you are superior in some way to being accepted because you are not superior in any way but just like us.   The one unanswerable insult, the absolutely worst name you can possibly call a person in today's society, is "fanatic", especially "religious fanatic".   If you confess at a fashionable cocktail party that you are plotting to overthrow the government, or that you are a PLO terrorist or a KGB spy, or that you molest porcupines or bite bats' heads off, you will soon attract a buzzing, fascinated, sympathetic circle of listeners.   But if you confess that you believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God, you will find yourself suddenly alone, with a distinct chill in the air.

Here are twelve of the commonest forms of this objection, the odium of elitism, with answers to each.
  1. "All religions are the same, deep down."

    That is simply factually untrue.   No one ever makes this claim unless he is (1) abysmally ignorant of what the different religions of the world actually teach or (2) intellectually irresponsible in understanding these teachings in the vaguest and woolliest way or (3) morally irresponsible in being indifferent to them.  The objector's implicit assumption is that the distinctive teachings of the world's religions are unimportant, that the essential business of religion is not truth but something else: transformation of consciousness or sharing and caring or culture and comfort or something of that sort — not conversion but conversation.  Christianity teaches many things no other religion teaches, and some of them directly contradict those others.  If Christianity isn't true, why be a Christian?

    By Catholic standards, the religions of the world can be ranked by how much truth they teach.

    * Catholicism is first, with Orthodoxy equal except for the one issue of papal authority.

    * Then comes Protestantism and any "separated brethren" who keep the Christian essentials as found in Scripture. 

    * Third comes traditional Judaism, which worships the same God but not via Christ. 

    * Fourth is Islam, greatest of the theistic heresies.

    * Fifth, Hinduism, a mystical pantheism;

    * Sixth, Buddhism, a pantheism without a theos;

    * Seventh, modern Judaism, Unitarianism, Confucianism, Modernism, and secular humanism, none of which have either mysticism or supernatural religion but only ethics;

    * Eighth, idolarity; and

    * Ninth, Satanism.

    To collapse these nine levels is like thinking the earth is flat.
  2. "But the essence of religion is the same at any rate: all religions agree at least in being religious."

    What is this essence of religion anyway?  I challenge anyone to define it broadly enough to include Confucianism, Buddhism, and modern Reform Judaism but narrowly enough to exclude Platonism, atheistic Marxism, and Nazism. 

    The unproved and unprovable assumption of this second objection is that the essence of religion is a kind of lowest common denominator or common factor.  Perhaps the common factor is a weak and watery thing rather than an essential thing.  Perhaps it does not exist at all.  No one has ever produced it.
  3. "But if you compare the Sermon on the Mount, Buddha's Dhammapada, Lao-tzu's Tao-te-ching, Confucius' Analects, the Bhagavad Gita, the Proverbs of Solomon, and the Dialogues of Plato, you willfind it:  a real, profound, and strong agreement."

    Yes, but this is ethics, not religion.  The objector is assuming that the essence of religion is ethics.  It is not.  Everyone has an ethic, not everyone has a religion.  Tell an atheist that ethics equals religion.  He will be rightly insulted, for you would be calling him either religious if he is ethical, or unethical because he is nonreligious.  Ethics maybe the first step in religion but it is not the last.  As C.S. Lewis says, "The road to the Promised Land runs past Mount Sinai."
  4. "Speaking of mountains reminds me of my favorite analogy.  Many roads lead up the single mountain of religion to God at the top.  It is provincial, narrow-minded, and blind to deny the validity of other roads than yours."

    The unproved assumption of this very common mountain analogy is that the roads go up, not down; that man makes the roads, not God; that religion is man's search for God, not God's search for man.  C. S. Lewis says this sounds like "the mouse's search for the cat".

    Christianity is not a system of man's search for God but a story of God's search for man.  True religion is not like a cloud of incense wafting up from special spirits into the nostrils of a waiting God, but like a Father's hand thrust downward to rescue the fallen.  Throughout the Bible, man-made religion fails.  There is no human way up the mountain, only a divine way down.  "No man has seen God at any time.  The only begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known."

    If we made the roads, it would indeed be arrogant to claim that any one road is the only valid one, for all human things are equal, at least in all being human, finite, and mixtures of good and bad.  If we made the roads, it would be as stupid to absolutize one of them as to absolutize one art form, one political system, or one way of skinning a cat.  But if God made the road, we must find out whether he made many or one.  If he made only one, then the shoe is on the other foot: it is humility, not arrogance, to accept this one road from God, and it is arrogance, not humility, to insist that our manmade roads are as good as God's God-made one. 

    But which assumption is true?  Even if the pluralistic one is true, not all religions are equal, for then one religion is worse and more arrogant than all others, for it centers on one who claimed, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life; no man can come to the Father but by me."
  5. "Still, it fosters religious imperialism to insist that your way is the only way.  You're on a power trip."

    No, we believe it not because we want to, because we are imperialistic, or because we invented it, but because Christ taught it.  It isn't our way, it's his way, that's the only way.  We're just being faithful to him and to what he said.  The objector's assumption is that we can make religion whatever we want it to.
  6. "If the one-way doctrine comes from Christ, not from you, then he must have been arrogant."

    How ironic to think Jesus is arrogant! No sin excited his anger more than the arrogance and bigotry of religious leaders.  No man was ever more merciful, meek, loving, and compassionate.

    The objector is always assuming the thing to be proved: that Christ is just one among many religious founders, human teachers.  But he claimed to be the Way, the Truth, and the Life; if that claim is not true, he is not one among many religious sages but one among many lunatics.  If the claim is true, then again he is not one among many religious sages, but the Way, the Truth, and the Life.
  7. "Do you want to revive the Inquisition?  Don't you value religious tolerance?  Do you object to giving other religions equal rights?"

    The Inquisition failed to distinguish the heresy from the heretic and tried to eliminate both by force or fire.  The objector makes the same mistake in reverse: he refuses to condemn either.  The state has no business defining and condemning heresy, of course, but the believer must do it-if not through the Church, then by himself.  For to believe x is to condemn non-x as false.  If you don't believe non-x is false, then you don't really believe x is true.
  8. "I'm surprised at this intolerance.  I thought Christianity was the religion of love."

    It is.  It is also the religion of truth.  The objector is separating two divine attributes.  We are not.  We are "speaking the truth in love".
  9. "But all God expects of us is sincerity."

    How do you know what God expects of us?  Have you listened to God's revelation?  Isn't it dangerous to assume without question or doubt that God must do exactly what you would do if you were God?  Suppose sincerity were not enough; suppose truth was needed too.  Is that unthinkable?  In every other area of life we need truth.  Is sincerity enough for a surgeon?  An explorer?  Don't we need accurate road maps of reality?

    The objector's implicit assumption here is that there is no objective truth in religion, only subjective sincerity, so that no one can ever be both sincere and wrong; that the spirit does not have objective roads like the body and the mind, which lead to distinct destinations: the body's physical roads lead to different cities and the mind's logical roads lead to different conclusions.  True sincerity wants to know the truth.
  10. "Are non-Christians all damned then?"

    No.  Father Feeny was excommunicated by the Catholic Church for teaching that "outside the Church, no salvation" meant outside the visible Church.  God does not punish pagans unjustly.  He does not punish them for not believing in a Jesus they never heard of, through no fault of their own (invincible ignorance).  But God, who is just, punishes them for sinning against the God they do know through nature and conscience (see Rom 1-2).  There are no innocent pagans, and there are no innocent Christians either.  All have sinned against God and against conscience.  All need a Savior.  Christ is the Savior
  11. "But surely there's a little good in the worst of us and a little bad in the best of us.  There's good and bad everywhere, inside the Church and outside."

    True.  What follows from that fact?  That we need no Savior?  That there are many Saviors?  That contradictory religions can all be true?  That none is true?  None of these implied conclusions has the remotest logical connection with the admitted premise. 

    There is a little good in the worst of us, but there's also a little bad in the best of us;  more, there's sin, separation from God, in all of us;  and the best of us, the saints, are the first to admit it.  The universal sin Saint Paul pinpoints in Romans 1:18 is to suppress the truth.  We all sin against the truth we know and refuse it when it condemns us or threatens our self-sufficiency or complacency.  We all rationalize.  Our duty is plain to us — to be totally honest — and none of us does his duty perfectly.  We have no excuse of invincible ignorance.
  12. "But isn't God unjust to judge the whole world by Christian standards?"

    God judges justly.  "All who sinned without [knowing] the [Mosaic] law will also perish without the law, and all who have sinned under the law will be judged by the law" (Rom 2:12).  Even pagans show "that what the law requires is written on their hearts" (Rom 2:15).  If we honestly consult our hearts, we will find two truths: that we know what we ought to do and be, and that we fail to do and be that.

    Fundamentalists, faithful to the clear one-way teaching of Christ, often conclude from this that pagans, Buddhists, et cetera, cannot be saved.  Liberals, who emphasize God's mercy, cannot bring themselves to believe that the mass of men are doomed to hell, and they ignore, deny, nuance, or water down Christ's own claims to uniqueness.  The Church has found a third way, implied in the New Testament texts.  On the one hand, no one can be saved except through Christ.  On the other hand, Christ is not only the incarnate Jewish man but also the eternal, preexistent word of God, "which enlightens every man who comes into the world" (Jn 1:9).  So Socrates was able to know Christ as word of God, as eternal Truth;  and if the fundamental option of his deepest heart was to reach out to him as Truth, in faith and hope and love, however imperfectly known this Christ was to Socrates, Socrates could have been saved by Christ too.  We are not saved by knowledge but by faith.  Scripture nowhere says how explicit the intellectual content of faith has to be.  But it does clearly say who the one Savior is. 
The Second Vatican Council took a position on comparative religions that distinguished Catholicism from both Modernist relativism and Fundamentalist exclusivism.  It taught that on the one hand there is much deep wisdom and value in other religions and that the Christian should respect them and learn from them.  But, on the other hand, the claims of Christ and his Church can never be lessened, compromised, or relativized.  We may add to our religious education by studying other religions but never subtract from it.

segunda-feira, 25 de novembro de 2013

What Marriage Is . . . and What It Isn't - by Robert P. George

In CERC
Marriage is the kind of good that can be chosen and meaningfully participated in only by people who have at least an elementary understanding of it and who choose it with that understanding in mind.
Marriage is an all-encompassing sharing of life.  It involves, like other bonds, a union of hearts and minds — but also, and distinctively, a bodily union made possible by the sexual-reproductive complementarity of man and woman.  Hence it is ordered to the all-encompassing goods of procreation and family life, and it calls for all-encompassing commitment, one that is pledged to permanence and sexual exclusivity and fidelity.  Marriage unites a husband and wife holistically, not merely in an emotional bond but also on the bodily plane in acts of conjugal love and in the children such love brings forth — for the whole of life.  Marriage is a form of relationship — indeed, the form of relationship — in which a man and a woman unite in a bond that is naturally ordered to, and would be fulfilled by, their conceiving and rearing children together.  And those who enter into this form of relationship — the human good of marriage — are truly and fully participants in it even where their bond is not blessed with the gift of children.
To be in such a relationship — a bodily as well as emotional union whose distinctive features and norms are shaped by its orientation to, and aptness for, procreation and the rearing of children — is intrinsically, not merely instrumentally, valuable.  So marriage, though it bears an inherent (rather than incidental) link to procreation, is not properly understood as having its value merely as a means to the good of conceiving and rearing children.  That is why, historically and rightly, infertility is not regarded as an impediment to marriage.  True bodily union in acts fulfilling the behavioral conditions of procreation is possible even where the nonbehavioral conditions of procreation happen not to obtain.  Such union can provide the foundation and matrix of the multilevel sharing of life that marriage is.
These insights into the nature of marriage as a human good require no particular theology.  They are, to be sure, consistent with Judeo-Christian faith, yet ancient thinkers untouched by Jewish or Christian revelation — including Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Musonius Rufus, Xenophanes, and Plutarch — also distinguished conjugal unions from all others, as do many nonbiblical faiths to this day.  Nor did animus against particular persons or categories of persons produce this conclusion, which arose in various cultures long before the modern concept of "sexual orientation."
Nevertheless, today many are demanding the redefinition of marriage as something other than a conjugal partnership.  Indeed, several jurisdictions in the West, including a number of European nations and several American states, have redefined marriage to eliminate the norm of sexual complementarity.  In truth, what they have done is abolish marriage as a legal category and replace it with something quite different — legally recognized sexual-romantic companionship or domestic partnership — to which the label marriage has been reassigned.  So, strictly speaking, we are talking not so much about a redefinition as an abolition of marriage.

When marriage is understood as a conjugal relationship — that is, as a comprehensive (emotional and bodily) union oriented toward procreation and the providing of children with both a mother and a father — it is easy to make sense of its core features as historically understood in Western and other cultures.  But eliminating the norm of sexual complementarity removes any ground of principle for these features.  After all, if two men or two women can marry, then what sets marriage apart from other bonds must be emotional intensity or priority.  But nothing about emotional union or intensity requires it to be permanent, as opposed to deliberately temporary.  Nothing beyond mere sentiment or subjective preference would require it to be sexually "closed" as opposed to "open," or limited to relationships of two persons, as opposed to three or more in "polyamorous" sexual ensembles.  There would be no ground for understanding marriage as a sexual partnership, as opposed to one integrated around any of a range of possible nonsexual shared interests or commitments (for example, playing tennis, reading novels, supporting a certain sports team).  Nor would there be any basis for understanding marriage as a relationship that is inherently enriched by family life and shaped by its demands.  Yet these have always been defining features and norms of marriage — features and norms that make marriage unlike other forms or companionship or friendship (and unlike in kind, not just in degree of emotional intensity).
These considerations buttress my point that what is at stake in contemporary debates about the definition and meaning of marriage is not whether to "expand" marriage to enlarge the pool of people "eligible" to participate in it.  What is at stake is whether to retain and support marriage in our law and culture or to jettison it in favor of a different way of organizing human relationships.
Marriage law shapes our actions by promoting a vision of what marriage is and, therefore, what its norms and requirements are.  In almost all Western jurisdictions, marriage has been deeply wounded by a culture of divorce, the widespread practice of nonmarital sexual cohabitation, the normalization of nonmarital childbearing, and other practices.  None of these had to do with same-sex partnerships or homosexual conduct, nor were or are people who are attracted to persons of the same sex responsible for them.  It was the impact of these practices on the public understanding of marriage that weakened people's grasp of marriage as a conjugal union and made the otherwise inconceivable idea of same-sex "marriages" conceivable.  Still, abolishing marriage as a legal category and reassigning the label marriage to sexual-romantic domestic partnerships would complete the rout, making it all but impossible to carry out the reforms needed to restore the conjugal understanding of marriage and with it a vibrant and healthy marriage culture.  The more we equate marriage with what amounts to a form of sexual-romantic companionship or domestic partnership, the more difficult it will be for people to live by the stabilizing norms specific to true marriage.  This is the lesson of the past forty-five years.  Unless we restore a sound understanding of marriage and rebuild the marriage culture, the erosion of marriage ideals will continue to harm everyone — children, spouses, societies as a whole — but especially the poorest and most vulnerable.  By rewriting the parenting ideal, abolishing conjugal marriage as the legal norm would undermine in our mores and practice the special value of biological mothers and fathers.  Moreover, by marking support for the conjugal view as "bigotry," it would, as we are already seeing in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere, damage religious liberty and freedom of speech and association.
It is important to bear in mind that under any marriage policy some bonds, some types of intimate relationship, will remain unrecognized, and thus some people will remain legally unmarried (however much they would like their relationships to count as marriages under law).  So we need to be able (and ought) to meet people's concrete needs apart from civil marriage.  Moreover, if we reject equating marriage with companionship — and marriage licenses with generic approval — we will see that conjugal marriage laws deprive no one of companionship or its joys and mark no one as less worthy of fulfillment.  True compassion means extending authentic community to everyone, especially the marginalized, while using marriage law for the social goal it serves best — the goal that justifies regulating such intimate bonds in the first place: to ensure that children know the committed love of the mother and father whose union brought them into being.
Just as compassion for same-sex-attracted people does not require redefining marriage, neither does preserving the conjugal view mean making them scapegoats for its erosion.  It certainly isn't about legalizing (or criminalizing) anything.  In all fifty of the United States, two men or women can have a wedding (if they happen to believe in same-sex marriage) and share a domestic life.  Their employers and religious communities are legally free to recognize their unions.  At issue here is whether governments will effectively coerce many other actors in the public square to do the same.  And also at issue is whether government will expand.  Robust support for marital norms serves children, spouses, and hence our whole economy, especially the poor.  Family breakdown thrusts the state into roles for which it is ill-suited: parent and discipliner to the orphaned and neglected, and arbiter of disputes over custody and paternity.

Redefining Means Undermining

Advocates of redefining "marriage" as sexual-romantic companionship or domestic partnership to accommodate same-sex relationships are increasingly confirming the point that this shift erodes the basis for permanence and exclusivity in any relationship.
University of Calgary philosophy professor Elizabeth Brake, for example, supports what she calls "minimal marriage," in which "individuals can have legal marital relationships with more than one person, reciprocally or asymmetrically, themselves determining the sex and number of parties, the type of relationship involved, and which rights and responsibilities to exchange with each."
Judith Stacey, a prominent New York University professor who is in no way regarded as a fringe figure, testified before Congress against the Defense of Marriage Act.  During her testimony, she expressed hope that the redefinition of marriage would give marriage "varied, creative, and adaptive contours...[leading some to] question the dyadic limitations of Western marriage and seek...small group marriages."
In their statement "Beyond Same-Sex Marriage," more than three hundred "LGBT and allied" scholars and advocates called for legally recognizing sexual relationships involving more than two partners.  Such relationships are by no means unheard of: Newsweek reported in 2009 that there were more than five hundred thousand in the United States alone.  In Brazil, a public notary has recognized a trio of people as a civil union.  Mexico City has considered expressly temporary marriage licenses.  The Toronto District School Board has taken to promoting polyamorous relationships among its students.
What about the connection to family life?  Writer E.  J.  Graff celebrates the fact that recognizing same-sex unions would change the "institution's message" so that it would "ever after stand for sexual choice, for cutting the link between sex and diapers."  Enacting same-sex marriage "does more than just fit; it announces that marriage has changed shape."
What about sexual exclusivity?  Andrew Sullivan, a self-styled proponent of the conservative case for same-sex marriage, has now gone so far as to extol the "spirituality" of "anonymous sex."  He welcomes the fact that the "openness" of same-sex unions might erode sexual exclusivity among those in opposite-sex marriages.
Similarly, in a New York Times Magazine profile, same-sex-marriage activist Dan Savage encourages spouses to adopt "a more flexible attitude" about sex outside their marriage.  A piece in The Advocate, a gay-interest newsmagazine, supports my point still more candidly: "Antiequality right-wingers have long insisted that allowing gays to marry will destroy the sanctity of 'traditional marriage,' and, of course, the logical, liberal party-line response has long been 'No, it won't.' But what if — for once — the sanctimonious crazies are right?  Could the gay male tradition of open relationships actually alter marriage as we know it?  And would that be such a bad thing?"
Other advocates of redefining marriage have explicitly proclaimed the goal of weakening the institution.  Former president George W.  Bush "is correct," writes journalist Victoria Brownworth, "when he states that allowing same-sex couples to marry will weaken the institution of marriage....It most certainly will do so, and that will make marriage a far better concept than it previously has been."  Michelangelo Signorile, another prominent advocate of redefining marriage, urges people in same-sex relationships to "demand the right to marry not as a way of adhering to society's moral codes but rather to debunk a myth and radically alter an archaic institution."  He says they should "fight for same-sex marriage and its benefits and then, once granted, redefine the institution of marriage completely, because the most subversive action lesbians and gay men can undertake...is to transform the notion of 'family' entirely."
Those wishing to overturn the traditional understanding of marriage as a male-female partnership increasingly agree that redefining marriage would undermine its stabilizing norms.
A Culture of Marriage

A standard revisionist response to the defense of conjugal marriage like the one I am here proposing is the claim that, even if the traditional position is, from the moral viewpoint, true, it is nevertheless unfair for the law to embody it.  For example, my friend and colleague Professor Stephen Macedo argues that if disagreements about the nature of marriage "lie in...difficult philosophical quarrels, about which reasonable people have long disagreed, then our differences lie in precisely the territory that John Rawls rightly marks off as inappropriate to the fashioning of our basic rights and liberties."  So Macedo and others claim that law and policy must be neutral with regard to competing understandings of marriage and sexual morality.
This claim is deeply unsound.  The true meaning, value, and significance of marriage are fairly easily grasped (even if people sometimes have difficulty living up to its moral demands) in a culture — including, critically, a legal culture — that promotes and supports a sound understanding of marriage.  Furthermore, ideologies and practices that are hostile to a sound understanding and practice of marriage in a culture tend to undermine the institution of marriage in that culture.  Hence it is extremely important that governments eschew attempts to be neutral with regard to marriage and embody in their laws and policy the soundest, most nearly correct, understanding.
The law is a teacher.  Either it will teach that marriage is a reality in which people can choose to participate but whose contours people cannot make and remake at will, or it will teach that marriage is a mere convention that is malleable in such a way that individuals, couples, or, indeed, groups can choose to make of it whatever suits their desires, goals, and so on.  The result, given the biases of human sexual psychology, will be the development of practices and ideologies that truly tend to undermine the sound understanding and practice of marriage, together with the development of pathologies that tend to reinforce the very practices and ideologies that cause them.
The Oxford philosopher Joseph Raz, a liberal who does not share my views regarding sexual morality, is rightly critical of forms of liberalism, including Rawlsianism, that suppose law and government can and should be neutral among competing conceptions of moral goodness.  He has noted, for example, that "monogamy, assuming that it is the only valuable form of marriage, cannot be practiced by an individual.  It requires a culture which recognizes it, and which supports it through the public's attitude and through its formal institutions."  Of course, Raz does not suppose that, in a culture whose law and public policy do not support monogamy, a man who happens to believe in it somehow will be unable to restrict himself to having one wife or will be required to take additional wives.  His point, rather, is that, even if monogamy is a key element in a sound understanding of marriage, large numbers of people will fail to understand that or why that is the case — and therefore will fail to grasp the value of monogamy and the point of practicing it — unless they are assisted by a culture that supports, formally by law and policy, as well as by informal means, monogamous marriage.  What is true of monogamy is equally true of the other elements of a sound understanding of marriage.
In short, marriage is the kind of good that can be chosen and meaningfully participated in only by people who have at least an elementary understanding of it and who choose it with that understanding in mind.  Yet people's ability to understand it, at least implicitly, and thus to choose it, depends crucially on institutions and cultural understandings that both transcend individual choice and are constituted by a vast number of individual choices.

Don y gratuidad en el pensamiento de Joseph Ratzinger. Claves para la teología moral - por Carlos Sánchez de la Cruz

In Almudi
 
Cuando nos sumergimos en la obra de Joseph Ratzinger, quedamos doblemente sorprendidos. Primero, porque la idea del don y la gratuidad apareció ante nosotros una y otra vez y, además, con una gran continuidad. Segundo, porque creímos constatar que no se había atendido suficientemente a esta sensibilidad en los numerosos estudios en torno a su figura y pensamiento, ni siquiera tras su elección pontificia, cuando los trabajos sobre el particular se han multiplicado de manera exponencial

 
Panzerkardinal, causante del cierre de la Iglesia ante la modernidad, martillo de la teología de la liberación, hardliner conservador, gran inquisidor encerrado en su torre de marfil, sepulturero de la fe, rottweiler de Dios. Estos son solo algunos de los numerosos clichés que durante años –especialmente desde que asumiera en 1981 la prefectura de la Congregación para la Doctrina de la Fe– han pesado sobre la figura de Joseph Ratzinger. Y, sin embargo, él no ha hecho nada por defenderse y romper estos prejuicios: ha preferido seguir laboriosamente su camino. Han sido sus primeras palabras como papa («[soy] un simple y humilde trabajador de la viña del Señor»)[1], así como la sorprendente temática de su primera encíclica Deus caritas est, las que han comenzado a resquebrajar la imagen férreamente construida sobre él para dejar entrever la categoría, ya no solo intelectual, sino humana y espiritual, del teólogo alemán. Como se ha dicho en repetidas ocasiones, quizá la profundización en su biografía, así como la lectura atenta de sus numerosos libros y artículos, ayudaría a deshacer estos prejuicios que se han venido vertiendo sobre él o, al menos, a no darlos de antemano por sentados.

Pero, si bien detenernos en su biografía y escritos más importantes se haría aquí imposible por el reducido espacio con el que contamos, abordaremos, sin embargo, uno de los aspectos en los que se hace evidente lo actual, sugerente y cautivador de nuestro teólogo: la llamativa presencia de la categoría del don y la gratuidad a lo largo de su extensa obra. Una presencia, por otra parte, nada anecdótica, sino fundamental, pues parece haber forjado su pensamiento desde que fuera un incipiente teólogo. De ser esto cierto, no serían pocas las consecuencias que de ahí se desprenderían para la teología moral, en particular en lo que se refiere a la relación de esta con la dogmática, la espiritualidad y la pastoral.

1. De la sobreabundancia al don y la gratuidad

Hace solo unos años que dedicamos nuestra atención al estudio y esclarecimiento de la categoría –no muy conocida ni atendida– de la sobreabundancia. La elección de dicha categoría vino determinada indudablemente por nuestra pertenencia a la Congregación del Santísimo Redentor. En el escudo de dicha congregación aparece la leyenda «Copiosa Apud Eum Redemptio», que forma parte de la perícopa del salmo 130,7b-8 y que recoge la formulación de la experiencia religiosa específicamente redentorista: el sentido de la Redención sobreabundante en Cristo. Esta intuición, completada por el magnífico texto paulino de Rm 5,20, abrió ante nosotros una perspectiva interesante: ciertamente se da en la historia una abundancia de pecado, de mal y sufrimiento, pero el cristiano vive en la certeza de que esta negatividad ha sido superada por la gracia sobreabundante de Dios en Cristo, siendo esta la realidad primera y fundante que constituye precisamente la novedad específicamente cristiana. Así, pudimos concluir que la sobreabundancia era, en efecto, una categoría apropiada para abordar el conjunto de la teología y que esto, lejos de tratarse de una extravagancia personal, encontraba correspondencias en distintos autores que, desde diversas ópticas, subrayaban su validez. Entre estos autores se encontraban Walter Kasper, Adolphe Gesché o Joseph Ratzinger que, yendo incluso más allá que los dos anteriores, postula una «ley de la sobreabundancia», dado que esta configura toda la historia de Dios con el ser humano; de hecho, dicha ley debe llegar a convertirse en ley fundamental del propio ser del hombre[2]. Pero no solo en el ámbito estrictamente teológico hallamos referencias en torno a la sobreabundancia. También y particularmente las encontramos en el ámbito filosófico: en Paul Ricoeur, Jean-Luc Marion, Michel Henry, Vladimir Jankélévitch, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Jacques Derrida o Claude Bruaire[3].

Llegados a este punto, la intuición inicial de que la categoría de la sobreabundancia podría contener una gran riqueza teológica, contrastada con el pensamiento teológico y filosófico de los autores citados, quedó inserta en una perspectiva más amplia. En efecto, todos los textos se referían en último término a un más, a una abundancia que suponía la ruptura o el sobrepasamiento de lo debido, a un ir más allá de lo esperado o meramente justo. Todos los textos apuntaban, en definitiva, a un marco más amplio y fundamental y, por tanto, de una mayor riqueza de significado: el de la idea que podríamos denominar don y gratuidad.

Así, fascinados por esta nueva perspectiva, creímos que sería muy interesante realizar un estudio en torno a este campo semántico. Tras una primera toma de contacto, nos cercioramos de la importancia creciente de esta idea en diversas disciplinas y de cómo, particularmente en los últimos años, habían aparecido diversos trabajos que aunaban acercamientos y enfoques variados en torno a este tema[4].

Fue también en este último recorrido cuando nos encontramos de nuevo con la impresionante figura de Joseph Ratzinger, con quien ya nos habíamos topado durante el estudio referido sobre la sobreabundancia. Cerciorados ahora de la gran riqueza que desprendían sus escritos en lo que se refiere a la categoría citada del don y la gratuidad, no pudimos menos que dedicarle toda nuestra atención.

2. Joseph Ratzinger, gran exponente del don y la gratuidad

Cuando, decididos a indagar más, nos sumergimos en su obra, quedamos doblemente sorprendidos. Primero, porque la idea del don y la gratuidad apareció ante nosotros una y otra vez y, además, con una gran continuidad. Segundo, porque creímos constatar que no se había atendido suficientemente a esta sensibilidad en los numerosos estudios en torno a su figura y pensamiento, ni siquiera tras su elección pontificia, cuando los trabajos sobre el particular se han multiplicado de manera exponencial.

Viéndonos en esta tesitura, nos pareció insuficiente realizar un estudio de la categoría del don y la gratuidad en un momento determinado de su producción. Pensamos, por el contrario, que sería más sugerente manifestar al lector, lo más ampliamente posible, la omnipresencia de dicha idea en su extensa obra, advirtiendo, por otra parte, que para captar su fuerte presencia interesa atender no únicamente a los términos «gratuidad» y «don», sino también a aquellos otros con un sentido idéntico, similar o que pueden inscribirse, por relación, dentro del mismo campo semántico: regalo, entrega, salida de sí, ‘ser-para’, sobreabundancia; también sus contrarios: egoísmo, orgullo, individualismo, concentración en el propio yo, autosuficiencia, moralismo, etc. Dicho estudio, publicado íntegramente hace apenas unos meses[5], es el que sirve de base a las presentes páginas, si bien éstas, obviamente, solo podrán resaltar algunas cuestiones fundamentales.

Tras esta amplia introducción, los siguientes epígrafes desarrollarán la idea que da título a nuestro escrito: la omnipresencia del don y la gratuidad en el pensamiento del teólogo alemán. Lo haremos aludiendo, en primer lugar, a algunos de sus trabajos más significativos, si bien podrían citarse infinidad de otros textos; seguidamente presentaremos lo que nuestro autor denomina leyes (fundamentales), amén de algunas imágenes, que explicitarán la misma idea referida; a continuación dedicaremos un epígrafe a dicha categoría en su relación con la moral; finalmente, presentaremos las conclusiones que podrían desprenderse de la decidida opción de nuestro teólogo por el don y la gratuidad.

3. El don y la gratuidad en J. Ratzinger. Trascendencia y continuidad

En un texto del año 1958, cuando apenas podemos hablar de él como un incipiente teólogo, Joseph Ratzinger manifiesta ya su sensibilidad e insistencia en la categoría de la gratuidad, cuando se lamenta de que «ordinariamente casi se pasa por alto… lo más decisivo: el carácter gratuito de la salvación»[6]. No será un caso aislado: su insistencia durante estos años en la misma idea se manifestará en textos de temática muy diferente[7].

Pero, si queremos afianzar lo cierto de nuestra intuición –que la categoría del don y la gratuidad es fundamental en el pensamiento de Ratzinger– no podemos dejar de atender, aunque sea brevemente, a la obra que le consagró como teólogo: su Introducción al cristianismo, publicada en el año 1968. Si bien ella viene a responder en definitiva a la pregunta de cuál es el auténtico contenido y sentido de la fe cristiana, desde nuestra sensibilidad nos atrevemos a decir que constituye, además, un verdadero tratado sobre la gratuidad. En efecto, en ninguna de sus obras nuestro teólogo hace un esfuerzo tan grande como en ésta por manifestar la primacía del don. Frente a la doctrina marxista, que propugna una primacía de la praxis, de lo histórico, una centralidad del poder-hacer, Ratzinger afirma aquí con contundencia, una y otra vez, que la clave de la fe –más aún, de la misma existencia humana– radica en el primado de la recepción. La existencia humana no subsiste en sí: su esencia descansa en el hecho de que ha sido donada. Y este hecho, como veremos, lejos de un moralismo, exige del hombre la superación de sí mismo; será ahí, precisamente, donde él hallará su verdadera esencia. Esta realidad del don y del salir de sí está fundamentada, en último término, en el hecho de que Dios es en sí un libre donarse. Y esto se ha manifestado en Cristo de una manera total: su ser es ‘ser-para’, salida de sí, éxodo de sí mismo. Ideas todas ellas que quedarán recogidas, dentro de esta trascendental obra, en lo que nuestro teólogo denomina «estructuras de lo cristiano». En ellas se evidencia la radical importancia de esta realidad del don y la gratuidad, y a ellas, precisamente por ser «fundamentales», habrá que regresar siempre para explicar los fundamentos del pensamiento del teólogo alemán.

Después de todo lo dicho, resultaría inexplicable que esta idea fundamental no tuviera continuidad. Ciertamente eso no ocurrirá. Ratzinger se mantendrá fiel a estas intuiciones a lo largo de toda su obra. Por tanto, no sorprenderá que, más de cuarenta años después de los trabajos citados, en su primera encíclica como papa, afirme: «Dios es amor… y, puesto que es Dios quien nos ha amado primero (cf. 1Jn 4,10), ahora el amor ya no es solo un mandamiento, sino la respuesta al don del amor»[8]. La fuerza e importancia de esta idea se mostrará de nuevo en su tercera encíclica, en la que hablará de la «sorprendente experiencia del don» y de que «el ser humano está hecho para el don… un don absolutamente gratuito de Dios»[9].

Con estas alusiones tan distantes entre sí pretendemos mostrar no solo la trascendencia, sino también la continuidad de la categoría del don y la gratuidad en el pensamiento de Joseph Ratzinger, que ha sido una constante en su producción teológica desde que empezara a escribir. Por tanto, la importancia que atribuye a esta idea quedará determinada por su frecuencia en escritos muy diversos, pero no solo; vendrá también dada por la formulación de lo que denomina «leyes (fundamentales)», así como por otras imágenes que desarrollarán lo que subyace a dicha realidad.

4. Leyes (fundamentales) e imágenes de la gratuidad

La idea del salir del propio egoísmo, la necesaria salida de sí hacia una nueva forma de existencia que vive para los demás es una de las constantes en el pensamiento de Ratzinger. Si bien va a utilizar numerosas imágenes a lo largo de su producción, son lo que él mismo denomina leyes (ya hemos visto la de la sobreabundancia) las que más nos interesan, puesto que ellas constituyen estructuras fundamentales de lo cristiano.

Una ley que tiene un gran peso en su pensamiento, como puede deducirse de su repetida aparición en diversos escritos, es la ley fundamental del éxodo: así la denomina ya en 1962; también aludirá a ella en sus sermones de Adviento de 1964[10]. Y ello para expresar que el hombre debe estar fuera de sí para estar en sí; de hecho, toda la historia vendría a ser un éxodo, una salida. Otras ideas afines a esta del éxodo, y que aparecen también en su obra, son las de éxtasis, exitus-reditus, proexistencia, procedere y, también, el llamado ‘principio para’, recogido en las ya citadas «estructuras de lo cristiano». La importancia de esta categoría de éxodo viene también dada por su presencia en algo tan improvisado como una de las entrevistas concedidas por nuestro teólogo[11]. Sus referencias como papa a esta misma realidad serán también abundantes; aparecerán incluso en su primera encíclica[12]. Por otra parte, el éxodo es una de las pocas ideas relacionadas con nuestro estudio que ha sido objeto de un trabajo concreto: el autor –redentorista que ha trabajo en la Congregación para la Doctrina de la Fe desde 1984– se pregunta en él si el éxodo no será una idea clave en el pensamiento del teólogo alemán[13].

Otra importante noción es la ley del grano de trigo, que ha de morir para dar fruto: ésta también regiría toda la creación y la historia de la salvación. Definida como fundamental por el propio Ratzinger en 1985[14], esta ley aparece ya, de nuevo, en sus sermones de 1964. Sin embargo, sorprendente mente, no ocupa un epígrafe independiente dentro de las «estructuras de lo cristiano»; será referida, sin embargo, dentro del ya citado ‘principio para’. Todavía serán muchas las veces que nuestro teólogo hará referencia a esta idea, si bien sin denominarla ley o principio. En su primera encíclica como papa dirá incluso que el grano de trigo describe el propio itinerario de Jesús.

Por su parte, aunque no se trata de una ley, la imagen del giro copernicano aparece ya en sus primeros escritos, también en el contexto de los sermones sobradamente aludidos de 1964. Esta imagen, junto con la de la fuerza de la gravedad, describe perfectamente nuestra situación inicial de egoísmo: todos vivimos en la «ilusión precopernicana»[15]. A la vez, esta imagen lleva en sí una invitación que acaso sea incluso exigencia: realizar la «revolución copernicana», dejando de considerarnos el centro del universo para amar caminando tras las huellas de Jesús. Insistimos: estas ideas no aparecen solo al principio de los escritos de nuestro teólogo, sino a lo largo de su vida en distintos contextos y artículos.

A modo de compendio, reiteramos que la ley de la sobreabundancia, del éxodo y del grano de trigo, los términos de éxtasis, ‘exitus-reditus’ y ‘procedere’, así como el ‘principio para’ y las imágenes del giro copernicano y la fuerza de la gravedad, constituyen una profunda expresión de la idea más genérica del don y la gratuidad que se hace concreta en ese actuar pródigamente, en ese darse y perderse que permiten al ser humano verdaderamente encontrarse.

5. Moralismo, moral y gratuidad
Conviene aclarar, en primer lugar, que Ratzinger no es un teólogo moral, es decir, que no se trata de un especialista o «profesional» en la materia. Esto supone, por tanto, que no ha llegado a elaborar una propuesta sistemática, sino que ésta aparece formulada en y a través de numerosos artículos, a modo de tesis sintéticas que no pretenden sino aclarar discusiones y abrir expectativas entre los moralistas. Si nuestro teólogo ha abordado las cuestiones morales es porque en su concienzuda investigación como teólogo dogmático se ha cerciorado de la profunda relación existente entre crisis de fe y crisis moral[16]; más aún, porque estamos ante un pensador que no se ha conformado con permanecer en la casuística, sino que ha querido siempre llegar a la raíz de los problemas; que no ha convertido la moral en moralismo –y ahora tendremos oportunidad de ver cuán importante es esta categoría para él–, sino que la ha entendido como plasmación de la fe creída y, más concretamente, como momento necesario de un encuentro personal con Cristo.

El moralismo, al que nos referíamos anteriormente, se refiere generalmente a la tendencia racionalista kantiana a reducir el cristianismo a las dimensiones de un entramado ético o a identificar la fe con la obediencia a una ley[17]. Pues bien, la permanente reserva de nuestro teólogo hacia esta idea de moralismo, que impediría vivir la experiencia de la existencia como benevolencia y regalo, viene a ratificar su insistencia en el don y la gratuidad, fundamentales en su pensamiento. Alusiones contrarias al moralismo aparecerán ya en el ensayo citado de 1958. Lo hará también al año siguiente a propósito de unas meditaciones sobre la navidad y en los archicitados sermones de 1964. En ellos Ratzinger plantea la pregunta de cuál es, propiamente, la realidad cristiana que supera el puro moralismo. La respuesta la reservará para el tercero y último de sus sermones: lo hará enunciando la «ley de la abundancia», que ya hemos citado y que constituye, a su vez, el fin de la prédica. Esta ley aparecerá también, como ya hemos dicho, en su magna obra de 1968, si bien ahora como «ley de la sobreabundancia». En ella dirá que «el hombre no forja lo auténtico por sí mismo», que «no es su creación, no es un producto suyo, sino una contrapartida que recibe como un don libre»[18]. Esta afirmación hallará su expresión más brillante, a modo de inclusión, en el primer número –repárese en la importancia de este hecho– de su primera encíclica como papa: «No se comienza a ser cristiano por una decisión ética o una gran idea, sino por el encuentro con un acontecimiento, con una Persona». Su segunda y tercera encíclicas incluirán también referencias a esta misma realidad.

La verdadera novedad del cristianismo, por tanto, más allá del mandamiento ya existente del amor al prójimo, no radica en la elevación de la exigencia moral, sino en el nuevo fundamento del ser: una novedad que solo puede venir del don de la comunión con Cristo, del vivir en él. El don (sacramentum) se convierte en ejemplo (exemplum) que, sin embargo, sigue siendo don[19]: «Ser cristiano es ante todo un don, pero que luego se desarrolla en la dinámica del vivir y poner en práctica este don»[20]. Y es precisamente aquí donde radica, en efecto, la especificidad de la moral cristiana.

El cristianismo, pues, se define como don y tarea: estar contentos por la cercanía interior de Dios y –fundándose en eso– contribuir activamente a dar testimonio en favor de Jesucristo. El cristiano no busca la autoperfección como una especie de defensa contra Dios; tampoco busca autorrealizarse y ser el arquitecto de su propia vida, como podría desprenderse de una deficiente comprensión del concepto de conciencia –a la cual, por cierto, nuestro teólogo da una importancia capital, entendiéndola como anámnesis del bien y la verdad[21]–, sino que acepta la gracia y, aceptándola, se libera de sí mis mismo, se hace capaz de darse a sí mismo, de dar lo no-necesario, a semejanza de la generosidad divina. Una generosidad divina que habla de la grandeza de un Dios que no requiere nuestros dones, porque Él mismo es el dador de todo don y porque todo lo esencial de nuestra vida se nos ha dado sin nuestra colaboración: «el hecho de que yo viva no se debe a mi esfuerzo… todo eso es gracia. No habríamos podido hacer nada si antes no se nos hubiera dado»[22].

En definitiva, el obrar moral del hombre se desarrolla a partir del encuentro con Dios. En consecuencia, la ética no es nunca una acción en sí misma, autárquica y autónoma, un puro logro humano, sino respuesta al don del amor y al acto de ser introducido en la dinámica del amor, de Dios mismo[23].

6. Conclusión

Llegados a este punto, y conscientes de que habría sido necesario un más elevado número de textos que ilustraran lo expuesto, así como una mayor atención a los temas que han ido aflorando a propósito de ellos, ratificamos lo expuesto: lo fundamental de la idea del don y la gratuidad en el pensamiento de Joseph Ratzinger, así como su fecundidad teológica en la dogmática toda. Una fecundidad que no podría darse si no fuera porque ella constituye, como ha repetido nuestro teólogo en innumerables ocasiones y de diversos modos, una realidad primera. Ella es, como él mismo dirá, la sencilla respuesta a la pregunta por la esencia del cristianismo; ella, bien comprendida, lo incluye todo.

Las consecuencias no pueden reducirse únicamente, sin embargo, al ámbito de la dogmática. Las consecuencias para la pastoral son, asimismo, claras y rotundas: si la esencia del cristianismo radica en la primacía de la gratuidad, del don que precede a toda acción y cuya experiencia se halla en el encuentro de amistad con Cristo, no podremos dejar de hacer lo imposible por anunciar, a tiempo y a destiempo, esta realidad absolutamente liberadora, así como conducir a hombres y mujeres al encuentro con Cristo, don de Dios.

Pero lo dicho sería insuficiente si no extrajéramos, como ya anticipamos, las consecuencias que se derivan para la moral y que, a nuestro parecer, son de una importancia decisiva. En primer lugar, en lo que respecta a su relación con la espiritualidad. Si bien ambas son disciplinas diversas, nuestro trabajo exige superar definitivamente su distancia histórica y epistemológica en pro de una convergencia que podría fundamentarse en la realidad del don y la gratuidad: la moral tendrá siempre que volver su mirada al encuentro con Cristo, donde se experimenta el don del amor absoluto e incondicional de Dios; en este encuentro hallará, ya no solo inspiración, sino el origen y sentido de toda acción. Y, en segundo lugar, las consecuencias que se desprenden de nuestra reflexión para la configuración de la teología moral como disciplina teológica. En efecto, no podemos menos que preguntarnos si acaso no podrían revisarse los fundamentos de la teología moral a la luz de esta categoría. Si la idea del don y la gratuidad constituye para nuestro teólogo el fundamento, la esencia del cristianismo que se ha manifestado una y otra vez en los distintos tratados teológicos, y si la vida moral no es en el fondo sino un donarse al otro en analogía al donarse de Dios al hombre, la teología moral obtendría ventaja segura al ser revisada por esta categoría, le devolvería su esplendor y frescura originales y alejaría de su horizonte la constante tentación de dejarse encantar, ya no solo por el moralismo, sino por el cálculo –que el mismo Ratzinger define como fariseísmo–, así como por el mandato «externo» que, sea dicho, no pocas veces la acecha.

Por último, guardamos la esperanza de que, inspirados en esta sensibilidad del teólogo alemán por la idea del don y la gratuidad, y anclados en Cristo, lugar de la experiencia del don de Dios, no falten quienes lleven a cabo la importante tarea a la que nos hemos referido. Una empresa que creemos enriquecería enormemente la perspectiva de la teología moral y la devolvería a su lugar natal o, con las mismas palabras de Ratzinger Ratzinger, a «lo más decisivo»: la gratuidad de la salvación de Dios que precede a toda respuesta humana, pero que, lejos de anclarla en una odiosa pasividad, la inserta en una dinámica de donación, de donde brota la vida sobreabundante y el fruto centuplicado.

Hasta aquí nuestro propósito y nuestro deseo. A Él, que no deja de regalarnos con sus dones, nos encomendamos para que los haga realidad. Por ahora, no podemos menos que agradecerle la oportunidad que nos ha dado de haber llegado hasta aquí y entrado de lleno en la obra impresionante de este teólogo que desde 2005 ocupa la cátedra de Pedro.
 
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[1] J. RATZINGER, «Bendición apostólica “urbi et orbi”. Primeras palabras de Su Santidad Benedicto XVI»: www.vatican.va (19 de abril de 2005).
[2] Cf. W. KASPER, El Dios de Jesucristo, Salamanca 1990³, 260, 337; A. GESCHÉ, Dios para pensar. Dios. El cosmos, Salamanca 1997, 157, 174; J. RATZINGER, «Sobre todo, el amor», en Ser cristiano, Salamanca 1967, 46-48; Íd., Introducción al cristianismo. Lecciones sobre el credo apostólico, Madrid 2001², 215-219, 243.
[3] Cf. P. RICOEUR, «Amor y justicia», en Amor y justicia, Madrid 1993; J. L. MARION, Siendo dado. Ensayo para una fenomenología de la donación, Madrid 2008; Íd., «La evidencia y el deslumbramiento», en Prolegómenos a la Caridad, Madrid 1993, 69-86; M. HENRY, Palabras de Cristo, Salamanca 2004; V. JANKÉLÉVITCH, El perdón, Barcelona 1999; J. L. CHRÉTIEN, Lo inolvidable y lo inesperado, Salamanca 2002; B. A. GNADA, Le principe don en éthique sociale et théologie morale. Une implication de la philosophie du don chez Derrida, Marion et Bruaire, Roma 2007.
[4] Cf. A. E. KOMTER (ed.), The Gift. An Interdisciplinary Perspective, Amsterdam 1996; A. D. SCHRIFT (ed.), The Logic of the Gift. Toward an Ethic of Generosity, Londres 1997; VV.AA., Gratuidad, justicia y reciprocidad. Dimensiones de una teología del don, Buenos Aires 2005.
[5] Cf. C. SÁNCHEZ DE LA CRUZ, Don y gratuidad en el pensamiento de Joseph Ratzinger, Madrid 2012, 208 pp.
[6] J. RATZINGER, «Los nuevos paganos y la Iglesia», en El nuevo pueblo de Dios. Esquemas para una Eclesiología, Barcelona 1972, 369.
[7] Cf. Íd., «Gratia praesupponit naturam», en Palabra en la Iglesia, Salamanca 1976, 144-146; Íd., «Para una teología de la muerte», en Palabra en la Iglesia, 214; Íd., «Resurrección y vida eterna», en Palabra en la Iglesia, 226-227, 230; Íd., «Tres meditaciones sobre la Navidad», en Palabra en la Iglesia, 281, 288.
[8] Íd., «Carta encíclica Deus caritas est»: www.vatican.va (25 de diciembre de 2005) 1.
[9] Íd., «Carta encíclica Caritas in veritate»: www.vatican.va (29 de junio de 2009) 34.
[10] Cf. Íd., «Gratia praesupponit naturam», 146; Íd., «La fe como servicio», en Palabra en la Iglesia, 37.
[11] Cf. Íd., Dios y el mundo. Creer y vivir en nuestra época. Una conversación con Peter Seewald, Barcelona 2002, 174-176.
[12] Cf. Íd., «Carta encíclica Deus caritas est», 6.
[13] Cf. R. TREMBLAY, «L’Èxode, une idée maitresse de la pensée théologique du Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger?»: Studia Moralia 28 (1990) 523-549.
[14] Cf. J. RATZINGER, «Buscar lo de arriba», en El resplandor de Dios en nuestro tiempo. Meditaciones sobre el año litúrgico, Barcelona 2008, 99.
[15] Íd., «Sobre todo, el amor», 44.
[16] Cf. E. BENAVENT VIDAL, «Prólogo», en J. E. PÉREZ ASENSI, Ética de la fe en la obra de Joseph Ratzinger. Hacia una propuesta ética para Europa, Valencia 2005, 12.
[17] Cf. T. ROWLAND, La fe de Ratzinger. La teología del papa Benedicto XVI, Granada 2009, 125.
[18] J. RATZINGER, Introducción al cristianismo, 224.
[19] Cf. Íd., Jesús de Nazaret. Segunda parte. Desde la Entrada en Jerusalén hasta la Resurrección, Madrid 2011, 78-83.
[20] Íd., «Magisterio eclesiástico, fe, moral», en J. RATZINGER, H. U. VON BALTHASAR y H. SCHÜRMANN, Principios de moral cristiana. Compendio, Valencia 2005², 47-48.
[21] Cf. Íd., «Conciencia y verdad», en La Iglesia. Una comunidad siempre en camino, Madrid 2005, 145-177.
[22] Íd., El camino pascual, Madrid 2005², 56-57.
[23] Cf. Íd., «¿El Catecismo de la Iglesia Católica está a la altura de la época? Meditaciones diez años después de su promulgación», en Caminos de Jesucristo, Madrid 2005², 155-156